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FROM CALDER TO MITCHELL:
SHOULD THE COURTS PATROL
CULTURAL BORDERS?
Peter W. Hutchins*
Anjali Choksi**

In what sense is an era ever truly finished — who sets the boundaries and how are
they patrolled. Do we not have overwhelming evidence, in our time and in every
period we study of an odd interlayering of cultural perspectives and a mixing of
peoples, so that nothing is ever truly complete or unitary.1
The object of our study, then, is prediction, the prediction of the incidence of the
public force through the instrumentality of the courts.2
... Constitutional protection of indigenous difference ought to extend beyond protection of certain customs, practices, and traditions integral to Aboriginal cultures
to include protection of interests associated with territory, sovereignty, and the
treaty process.3

I. INTRODUCTION — THE INITIAL VISION
In Mitchell the Supreme Court of Canada reversed the judgments of two
lower courts by (1) re-characterizing the right claimed by the plaintiff and (2)
re-evaluating the evidence led by the plaintiff in support of this newly characterized right.4
Our analysis of the Mitchell decision focuses on four matters. What does the
decision say about predictability and consistency in Aboriginal rights litigation?

* Peter W. Hutchins is a partner in the firm of Hutchins, Soroka & Dionne in Montreal and
Hutchins, Soroka & Grant in Vancouver.
** Anjali Choksi is a partner in the Montreal firm of Hutchins, Soroka & Dionne.
The authors disclose that they both acted as counsel for Grand Chief Michael Mitchell in
Mitchell v. M.N.R. before the Federal Court Trial Division, the Federal Court of Appeal and the
Supreme Court of Canada. They also appeared for George Weldon Adams in R. v. Adams before
the Supreme Court of Canada. Peter Hutchins appeared before the Court in R. v. Pamajewon and
Anjali Choksi in R. v. Côté. Peter Hutchins has appeared in the Supreme Court and in the courts
below on numerous other occasions for Aboriginal parties. The authors express their appreciation
for comments supplied by William Henderson in an earlier version of this paper.
1
Gallagher and Greenblatt, Practicing New Historicism (2000) at 7.
2
Holmes, “The Path of the Law” (1897) 10 Harv. L.R. 160, at 160 [hereinafter Holmes].
3
Macklem, Indigenous Difference and the Constitution of Canada (2001) at 49.
4
[2001] 1 S.C.R. 911 [hereinafter Mitchell, SCC].
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What does the decision say about how the Van der Peet test5 is being applied?
How does the rights discourse and analysis in Van der Peet, as argued by the
Crown and applied by the Court in Mitchell, compare with the rights discourse
which Canada and the provinces promote in negotiation of Aboriginal claims?
And, finally, are there alternatives to the Van der Peet rights analysis which can
be proposed?
There are two seemingly contradictory forces at work in the judgment of the
Supreme Court of Canada in Mitchell v. M.N.R.:
•

On one hand, it reflects the increasingly misguided attempts of the
courts to impose judicial positivism on history and culture;
At the same time, it introduces further confusion and uncertainty into an
area of law, crying out for certainty, by throwing into doubt the robustness of established and developing judicial doctrine, including:
• deference to the Trial Judge;
• response to the pleadings as framed;
• the role of the justification test in protecting society; and
• the role of section 35 in reconciling Crown sovereignty and preexisting Aboriginal societies.

•

Professor Mark Walters in his excellent paper entitled “The Right to Cross a
River?: Aboriginal Rights in the Mitchell Case” writes that:
Within the space of three paragraphs in Mitchell the law of Aboriginal rights in
Canada was reduced to doctrinal shambles.6

In our view, damage has certainly been done. Before we examine the Court’s
approach to Aboriginal/Crown relations and Aboriginal legal issues in the final
decades of the 20th century and the dawning of the new millennium, it might be
instructive to consider how the Court was dealing with these issues at the end
of the Victorian period. As Chief Justice Dickson and La Forest J. pointed out
in their reasons in Sparrow, in the earlier period, Aboriginal7 cases “were essentially concerned with settling legislative jurisdiction or the rights of commercial enterprises”.8 The people whose rights and interests were at stake were
rarely, if ever, parties in court. In 1895, Sedgewick J. in In Re Indian Claims
acknowledged this but went on to announce how our courts, with the consent of
5

R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507 [hereinafter Van der Peet].
Walters, “The Right to Cross a River?: Aboriginal Rights in the Mitchell Case” prepared
for the Toronto Conference of the Pacific Business and Law Institute, October 25, 2001, at 7
[hereinafter Walters].
7
Or as the expression was at the time “Indian”.
8
R. v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075, at 1103 [hereinafter Sparrow].
6
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the Crown and of all of our governments, should approach “all questions between Her Majesty and ‘Her faithful Indian allies’”. He wrote:
Another consideration has a bearing on the matter. The contest in this case is not
between the Indians on the one hand and the Government on the other; it is in its
last analysis a contest between Ontario and Quebec. The principle of generous construction so ably and correctly pointed out by the learned Chancellor would very
properly be applicable were it a case of the former kind. Had the rights of the Indians been in question here — were their claims to the increased annuity disputed —
did that depend upon some difficult question of construction or upon some ambiguity of language — courts should make every possible intendment in their favour
and to that end. They would with the consent of the Crown and of all of our governments strain to their utmost limit all ordinary rules of construction or principles
of law — the governing motive being that in all questions between Her Majesty
and “Her faithful Indian allies” there must be on her part, and on the part of those
who represent her, not only good faith, but more, there must be not only justice, but
generosity. The wards of the nation must have the fullest benefit of every possible
doubt.9

In the context of Mitchell, the reference to the Queen’s “faithful Indian allies” is particularly poignant given the role of the Mohawks as crucial military
forces and allies for the British during the French/British and British/American
conflicts in North America through to the end of the War of 1812 and how this
military tradition, so useful to the British for so long, 10 was turned against them
by the Supreme Court in Mitchell. Also of interest in the words of Sedgewick J.
is the suggestion that there must be on the part of Her Majesty not only good
faith, not only justice, but generosity. The latter quality is remarkably absent in
the manner in which the Court re-characterized Chief Mitchell’s claim as expressed in the pleadings and reiterated in the evidence at trial.
Two years later in St. Catharines Milling and Lumber Co. v. The Queen,
Strong J. in lengthy dissenting reasons (but not of this point) invoked once
again the role of Indian Nations as faithful allies of the Crown and how this
condition had been won through a system whereby the British recognized their
rights to lands and guaranteed their protection in the possession and enjoyment
of such lands. He wrote:
That the more liberal treatment accorded to the Indians by this system of protecting
them in the enjoyment of their hunting grounds and prohibiting settlement on lands
which they had not surrendered, which it is now contended the British North America Act has put an end to, was successful in its results, is attested by the historical

9

[1895] 25 S.C.R. 434, at 534-35.
See, for instance, Mitchell v. M.N.R., [1997] 4 C.N.L.R. 103, at 157, 171-180 (F.C.T.D.)
[hereinafter Mitchell Fed. Court].
10
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fact that from the memorable year 1763, when Detroit was besieged and all the Indian tribes were in revolt, down to the date of confederation, Indian wars and massacres entirely ceased in the British possessions in North America, although
powerful Indian nations still continued for some time after the former date to inhabit those territories. That this peaceful conduct of the Indians is in a great degree
to be attributed to the recognition of their rights to lands unsurrendered by them,
and to the guarantee of their protection in the possession and enjoyment of such
lands given by the crown in the proclamation of October, 1763, hereafter to be
more fully noticed, is a well known fact of Canadian history which cannot be controverted. The Indian nations from that time became and have since continued to be
the firm and faithful allies of the crown and rendered it important military services
in two wars — the war of the Revolution and that of 1812.11

The Supreme Court’s current voyage of discovery on the matter of Aboriginal title and rights can be said to have commenced with Calder in 1973.12 Although Calder involved Aboriginal title, what we now refer to as a title case, it
is instructive to see how the two justices writing the substantive reasons, Judson
and Hall JJ., approached the matter of characterizing Aboriginal culture, in this
particular case that of the Nisga’a Nation.
The fact is that both justices appeared comfortable in characterizing the
rights being claimed in general terms based upon the fact of Aboriginal occupation and were at pains to avoid as much as possible imposing narrow Western
legal concepts.
Justice Judson in an oft cited passage expressed the situation as follows:
Although I think that it is clear that Indian title in British Columbia cannot owe its
origin to the Proclamation of 1763, the fact is that when the settlers came, the Indians were there, organized in societies and occupying the land as their forefathers
had done for centuries. This is what Indian title means and it does not help one in
the solution of this problem to call it a “personal or usufructuary right”. What they
are asserting in this action is that they had a right to continue to live on their lands
as their forefathers had lived and that this right has never been lawfully extinguished. There can be no question that this right was “dependent on the goodwill of
the Sovereign”.13

Justice Hall, in quoting Frank Calder in cross-examination, appeared comfortable with the characterization of the right as asserted by the Nisga’a Nation:
The nature of the title of the interest being asserted on behalf of the Nishgas was
stated in evidence by Calder in cross-examination as follows:

11
12
13

(1887) 13 S.C.R. 577, at 609-610.
Calder v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1973] S.C.R. 313 [hereinafter Calder].
Ibid., at 328.
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From time immemorial the Naas River Nishga Indians possessed, occupied and used the Naas Valley, Observatory Inlet, and Portland Inlet and
Canal, and within this territory the Nishgas hunted in its woods, fished in
its waters, streams and rivers. Roamed, hunted and pitched their tents in
the valleys, shores and hillsides. Buried their dead in their homeland territory. Exercised all the privileges of free men in the tribal territory. The
Nishgas have never ceded or extinguished their aboriginal title within this
territory.14

In reviewing the jurisprudence both of the United States and the Commonwealth, Hall J. noted the general characterization of the relationship between
Indian Nations and the European newcomers preferred by the courts:
The dominant and recurring proposition stated by Chief Justice Marshall in Johnson v. McIntosh is that on discovery or on conquest the aborigines of newly-found
lands were conceded to be the rightful occupants of the soil with a legal as well as a
just claim to retain possession of it and to use it according to their own discretion,
but their rights to complete sovereignty as independent nations were necessarily
diminished and their power to dispose of the soil on their own will to whomsoever
they pleased was denied by the original fundamental principle that discovery or
conquest gave exclusive title to those who made it.15

Approximately 10 years after Calder, Dickson J. in Guerin had the occasion
to review the Court’s earlier jurisprudence on Indian title and Indian interests in
lands this time in the context of submissions regarding the legal character of the
Crown’s fiduciary duty.16
Once again, the majority of the Court, speaking through Dickson J., came to
the conclusion that attempts at precise juridical characterization of the Indian
interest was “both unnecessary and potentially misleading”. Justice Dickson
wrote:
It appears to me that there is no real conflict between the cases which characterize Indian title as a beneficial interest of some sort, and those which characterize it
a personal, usufructuary right. Any apparent inconsistency derives from the fact
that in describing what constitutes a unique interest in land the courts have almost
inevitably found themselves applying a somewhat inappropriate terminology drawn
from general property law. There is a core of truth in the way that each of the two
lines of authority has described native title, but an appearance of conflict has nonetheless arisen because in neither case is the categorization quite accurate.

14

Ibid., at 351.
Ibid., at 383. The so-called Marshall trilogy: Johnson v. M’Intosh, 8 Wheat. 543 (1823),
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 5 Pet. 1 (1831), and Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515 (1832), established the direction of U.S. Indian law.
16
Guerin v. The Queen, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335.
15
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... The nature of the Indians’ interest is therefore best characterized by its general
inalienability, coupled with the fact that the Crown is under an obligation to deal
with the land on the Indians’ behalf when the interest is surrendered. Any description of Indian title which goes beyond these two features is both unnecessary and
potentially misleading.17

With respect to the contradictions in the Court’s judgment in Mitchell to
which we referred at the outset, what is curious is that the Chief Justice who
wrote the majority reasons in Mitchell had previously, in her dissenting reasons
in Van der Peet, appeared to question not only the legal positivism at work in
the Court’s test but also the appropriateness of using certain cultural concepts
as “the markers of legal rights”.
On the first point, the Chief Justice quite rightly points out in her dissent in
Van der Peet that the Court originally used the concept of integrality in a completely different context in Sparrow:
... The governing concept of integrality comes from a description in the Sparrow
case where the extent of the aboriginal right (to fish for food) was not seriously in
issue. It was never intended to serve as a test for determining the extent of disputed
exercises of aboriginal rights.18

In another section of her dissenting reasons the Chief Justice takes a considerably more flexible approach to determining whether modern practices constitute Aboriginal rights than is apparent in her majority reasons in Mitchell:
If a specific modern practice is treated as the right at issue, the analysis may be
foreclosed before it begins. This is because the modern practice by which the more
fundamental right is exercised may not find a counterpart in the aboriginal culture
of two or three centuries ago. So if we ask whether there is an aboriginal right to a
particular kind of trade in fish, i.e., large-scale commercial trade, the answer in
most cases will be negative. On the other hand, if we ask whether there is an aboriginal right to use the fishery resource for the purpose of providing food, clothing
or other needs, the answer may be quite different. Having defined the basic underlying right in general terms, the question then becomes whether the modern practice at issue may be characterized as an exercise of the right.
This is how we reconcile the principle that aboriginal rights must be ancestral
rights with the uncompromising insistence of this Court that aboriginal rights not
be frozen. The rights are ancestral; they are the old rights that have been passed
down from previous generations. The exercise of those rights, however, takes modern forms. To fail to recognize the distinction between rights and the contemporary form in which the rights are exercised is to freeze aboriginal societies

17
18

Ibid., at 382.
Van der Peet, supra, note 5, at para. 255.
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in their ancient modes and deny to them the right to adapt, as all peoples must,
to the changes in the society in which they live.
I share the concern of L’Heureux-Dubé J. that the Chief Justice defines the
rights at issue with too much particularity, enabling him to find no aboriginal right
where a different analysis might find one. By insisting that Mrs. Van der Peet’s
modern practice of selling fish be replicated in pre-contact Sto:lo practices, he effectively condemns the Sto:lo to exercise their right precisely as they exercised it
hundreds of years ago and precludes a finding that the sale constitutes the exercise
of an aboriginal right.19

With respect to the Court engaging in cultural analysis, the Chief Justice
stated in her reasons in Van der Peet:
The problem of overbreadth thus brings me to my second concern, the problem
of indeterminacy. To the extent that one attempts to narrow the test proposed
by the Chief Justice by the addition of concepts of distinctiveness, specificity
and centrality, one encounters the problem that different people may entertain
different ideas of what is distinctive, specific or central. To use such concepts
as the markers of legal rights is to permit the determination of rights to be coloured by the subjective views of the decision-maker rather than objective
norms, and to invite uncertainty and dispute as to whether a particular practice constitutes a legal right.20

We suggest that if one focuses on the language highlighted in the preceding
passages, one is presented with an approach to understanding and characterizing claims of Aboriginal title and rights that is considerably more liberal than
the ultimate reasoning in Mitchell. They demonstrate a holistic and dynamic
perspective both as to what Aboriginal societies once were and also as to what
they have become. They suggest that the reconciliation so urged by the courts
should involve not an act of reconciling contemporary non-Aboriginal society
with a museum diorama approach to Aboriginal societies, to use Professor Brad
Morse’s apt image,21 but rather with the contemporary and evolving Aboriginal
societies which exist across this land.

19

Ibid., at paras. 239, 240, 241 (emphasis added).
Ibid., at para. 257 (emphasis added).
21
Morse, “Permafrost Rights: Aboriginal Self-Government and the Supreme Court in R. v.
Pamajewon” (1997), 42 McGill L.J. 1011 [hereinafter Morse].
20
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II. PREDICTABILITY IN ABORIGINAL RIGHTS LITIGATION
1. Seeking Terra Firma
The renowned American jurist Oliver Wendell Holmes, in his article entitled
The Path of the Law discussed the object of the study of law in the following
terms:
When we study law we are not studying a mystery but a well known profession.
We are studying what we shall want in order to appear before judges, or to advise
people in such a way as to keep them out of court. The reason why it is a profession, why people will pay lawyers to argue for them or to advise them, is that in societies like ours the command of the public force is intrusted to the judges in certain
cases, and the whole power of the state will be put forth, if necessary, to carry out
their judgments and decrees. People want to know under what circumstances and
how far they will run the risk of coming against what is so much stronger than
themselves, and hence it becomes a business to find out when this danger is to be
feared. The object of our study, then, is prediction, the prediction of the incidence
of the public force through the instrumentality of the courts.22

Justice Holmes concluded the passage above by identifying the object of the
study of law as prediction and, in particular, prediction of the “incidence of the
public force through the instrumentality of the Courts”. The area of the law
applying to Aboriginal peoples is and has been a rapidly evolving one over the
past decades. Chief Justice Lamer himself acknowledged this in Delgamuukw
v. British Columbia.23 Mitchell represents at least a pause in this evolution, as
well as a challenge to counsel and clients attempting what Holmes J. referred to
as the prediction of the incidence of the public force through the instrumentality
of the courts.
Professor Brian Slattery, who in a very real sense has been our medium in
this area of law, published an article which he entitled Making Sense of Aboriginal and Treaty Rights. He introduced that article as follows:
Over the past thirty years, the Supreme Court of Canada has begun remapping the
neglected territory of aboriginal and treaty rights. It has done so piecemeal, in a series of important decisions extending from Calder in 1973 to the recent Marshall
case. When it started, the Court had little to go on. The results of previous forays
into this territory had been uncertain at best and misleading at worst. The leading
authority on the subject, the Privy Council decision in St. Catharine’s Milling and
Lumber Company, was replete with dubious assumptions and obscure terminology.
In effect, the Supreme Court inherited a sketch map of shadowy coasts and fabulous isles, with monsters at every turn.

22
23

Holmes, supra, note 2, at 160.
[1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, at paras. 75, 79 and 159 [hereinafter Delgamuukw].

(2002), 16 S.C.L.R. (2d)

Should the Courts Patrol Cultural Borders?

249

Let it be said that the Supreme Court has fared well in its initial ventures. Littleknown areas have been brought to light and apocryphal seas dispelled. We now
know broadly what is terra firma and what is not, and the monsters have been
largely tamed or banished to the decorative margins. Nevertheless, the first fruits of
the Court’s labours amount to a series of explorer’s charts, enlightening so far as
they go, but covering different areas, drawn in varying projections, and sometimes
bearing an uncertain relation to one another. We lack a reliable mappamundi. The
purpose of this paper is to attempt such a map — one that surveys the subject as a
whole and displays the various parts in their proper dimensions and interrelationships.24

Now when Professor Slattery wrote those words, the Supreme Court of Canada had not yet handed down its judgment in Mitchell v. M.N.R. Where would
Professor Slattery place the Mitchell decision in his mappamundi? He states
that:
We now know broadly what is terra firma and what is not, and the monsters have
been largely tamed or banished to the decorative margins. 25

After Mitchell one might be inclined to be sceptical.
Professor Kent McNeil is less sanguine about the progress of our courts in
charting the terra firma and banishing the monsters:
Despite vacillations in policy from treaty acknowledgement of tribal sovereignty
and land rights through removal, allotment, reorganization, termination and selfdetermination, the doctrinal foundations of Indian law have been fairly well settled
in the United States since the Marshall Court decisions of the 1820s and 1830s. Not
so in Canada, where the courts are only beginning to address some major Aboriginal rights issues. Prominent among these are the issue of the nature of Aboriginal
rights to land (commonly known as Aboriginal title), and the question of whether
the Aboriginal peoples have an inherent right of self-government.26

Does Mitchell assist us in locating Professor Slattery’s terra firma? Does it
help to tame or banish the monsters that have intimidated our political and
judicial systems when faced with claims of Aboriginal peoples? We believe the
answer is no on both counts. In its judgment, the Supreme Court shifted the
ground under Aboriginal litigants’ feet and one must wonder if it was not the
fear of monsters, in this instance an Aboriginal claim asserted in respect of the
international border, which caused the Court to do so despite Chief Mitchell’s
best efforts to frame his case narrowly and responsibly.
24

Slattery, “Making Sense of Aboriginal and Treaty Rights” (2000) 79 Can. Bar Rev. 196, at

25

Ibid.
McNeil, Emerging Justice? Essays on Indigenous Rights in Canada and Australia (2001),

197.
26

at 59.
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2. Do Aboriginal Plaintiffs Have the Prerogative to
Characterize the Rights They Claim?
It might be instructive to point out immediately that the pleadings in Mitchell
were framed years before the Supreme Court’s realignment of this area of law
through the Van der Peet trilogy.27 In fact those judgments were rendered approximately one month before Mitchell went to trial in September 1996.
Before the Federal Court Trial Division, three distinct purposes for bringing
goods across the international border were identified and two sources of those
rights were pleaded. At issue was the right when bringing goods across the
border for personal purposes, for community purposes or for the purpose of
trade with other First Nations, to do so duty free. On this basis, evidence was
led at trial. Two sources of these rights were pleaded, an Aboriginal right and
treaty rights.28
With respect to the scope of the rights claimed, it is instructive to refer to the
plaintiffs’ opening statement on the first day of trial. A number of points were
stated very clearly:
Plaintiff is not asking this Court to endorse activities or behaviour that could be
said to be antisocial or that threaten the state or its citizens.
Chief Mitchell’s progress across the Cornwall International Bridge on March 22,
1988 was not an act of defiance against Canadian sovereignty;
There was nothing at all clandestine about the actions involved in this case. Chief
Mitchell made a truthful oral declaration concerning the description and destination
of the goods.
So that it will be perfectly clear from the outset of the trial, Plaintiff states immediately and unequivocally that he is not here pleading and that this case is not about
any right to bring across the Canada-U.S. border any form of fire-arm or any form
of restricted or prohibited drug, alcohol, plants or the like. Nor do the facts in this
case raise the issue of importation into Canada of commercial goods for the primary purpose of competing in the commercial mainstream in Canada. Plaintiff is
not seeking any judicial determination of that issue in this case.

27

Van der Peet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507; R. v. Gladstone, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 723 [hereinafter
Gladstone]; R. v. N.T.C. Smokehouse Ltd., [1996] 2 S.C.R. 672.
28
The treaty rights argument was based upon the rights in Article XV of the Treaty of
Utrecht and Article III of the Jay Treaty as confirmed by Article IX of the Treaty of Ghent, as well
as on treaty councils between the Crown and First Nations which took place in 1795, 1796 and
1815. The treaty rights argument was unsuccessful in both the Federal Court Trial Division and the
Federal Court of Appeal and was not pursued in the Supreme Court of Canada.
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The modern context in which the Plaintiff seeks recognition of his Aboriginal right
involves addressing the responsible exercise of rights and responsibilities and the
appropriate respective roles for Mohawk authorities and Canadian authorities.29

The trial judge understood the right as characterized by Chief Mitchell and
the efforts by Chief Mitchell to frame the claims responsibly. His order, following 85 pages of analysis, read in part:
1.

the plaintiff as a Mohawk of Akwesasne resident in Canada has an existing
Aboriginal right which is constitutionally protected by ss. 35 and 52 of the
Constitution Act, 1982 to pass and repass freely across what is now the
Canada-United States boundary including the right to bring goods from the
United States into Canada for personal and community use without having
to pay customs duties on those goods. Goods for personal and community
use includes goods used for sustenance, household goods and goods used
for First Nations’ custom. The Aboriginal right includes the right to bring
these goods from the United States into Canada for non-commercial scale
trade with other First Nations.

As the plaintiff has explained, the Aboriginal right does not include the right to
bring into Canada any form of firearm, restricted or prohibited drug, alcohol, plants
and the like. The Aboriginal right is also limited to the extent that any Mohawk of
Akwesasne entering Canada with goods from the United States will be subject to
search and declaration procedures at Canadian Customs.30

The trial judge, while upholding the Aboriginal right, found that the right as
pleaded was not to be found in a treaty within the meaning of section 35(1) of
the Constitution Act, 1982. The trial judge, however, did refer to the Jay Treaty
as useful evidence of the historical context of the treatment of First Nations and
of what the European powers were prepared to stipulate on behalf of the First
Nations.31
In the Federal Court of Appeal, all three judges once again acknowledged
that the claim contemplated goods being brought across the border for various
distinct purposes. Justice Létourneau in his reasons would have limited the
29

Mitchell v. M.N.R., Federal Court Trial Division, plaintiff’s opening statement, Sept. 1996,
trial transcript Vol. 1, pp. 17, 18 and 50.
30
Mitchell Fed. Court, supra, note 10, at 192.
31
He stated
“...The treaty does not have legal validity and is not enforceable in Canada, however,
it is a historical document and therefore has some historical significance. Consequently it is
useful as evidence of the historical context of the treatment of First Nations during that period. However, since the First Nations were not involved in the negotiations, drafting or ratification of the agreement, at best it is evidence of what two countries were prepared to
include in an agreement between themselves on behalf of a third party.”
ibid., at 187.
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right to an Aboriginal right constitutionally protected by sections 35 and 52 of
the Constitution Act, 1982:
...when crossing the international border at Cornwall Island, to bring with himself
in Canada, for personal use or consumption, or for collective use or consumption
by the members of the community of Akwesasne, goods bought in the State of New
York without having to pay any duty or taxes to the Canadian government or authority.32

Justice Sexton, with Isaac C.J. agreeing, defined the right as follows:
1.

the plaintiff as a Mohawk of Akwesasne resident in Canada has an existing
aboriginal right which is constitutionally protected by sections 35 and 52 of
the Constitution Act, 1982, when crossing the international border from New
York to Ontario or Quebec, to bring with him to Canada, for personal use or
consumption, or for collective use or consumption by the members of the
community of Akwesasne, or for non-commercial scale trade with First Nation
communities in Ontario or Quebec, goods bought in the State of New York
without having to pay any duty or taxes to the government of Canada.33

Something strange happened to Chief Mitchell’s right as pleaded when it arrived at the Supreme Court of Canada. It is interesting to note that McLachlin
C.J., in summarizing the decisions below, acknowledged that both the courts
below had included in their orders goods for personal and community use as well
as goods for non-commercial scale trade with other First Nations. The Chief
Justice then proceeded to re-characterize the Aboriginal right claimed.
Notwithstanding that Chief Mitchell had characterized his claim as including
three categories of goods, personal goods, community goods and goods for
small scale trade, and notwithstanding that the four judges in the courts below
had understood the claim to include those three categories of goods, the Chief
Justice at paragraph 16 decided that the claim was really about bringing goods
across the Canada/United States border for purposes of trade. The Chief Justice
effectively telescoped the various and distinct elements of the right pleaded
into, coincidentally, the characterization which might be seen to be the most
controversial. Suddenly Chief Mitchell’s actions became entirely focused on
trade. Suddenly, the evidence led by Chief Mitchell concerning the historical
importance of trade to the Mohawks was represented as excluding evidence in
regard to personal and community goods.

32
Mitchell v. M.N.R., [1999] 1 F.C. 375, at 394 (F.C.A.) [hereinafter Mitchell Fed. Court
Appeal] in reference to the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982
(U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Constitution Act, 1982”].
33
Ibid., at 399 (emphasis added).
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The trial judge, while finding that one reason for Chief Mitchell’s actions
was to renew an historical trading relationship with Tyendinaga through the
giving of gifts, also found that the evidence showed that personal and community goods were included in what Chief Mitchell brought across the border.
This included supplies for a community store.34
With respect, we note that there may be an inconsistency in the reasons of
the Chief Justice as to what pre-contact activities must appropriately be invoked
in support of a claim for Aboriginal rights. We have seen that the Aboriginal
activities of transporting personal goods or community goods were not considered in the Court’s characterization of Chief Mitchell’s claim. There was, as we
have described it, a telescoping of Aboriginal activities relating to personal,
community and trade goods. On the other hand, when it came to Chief
Mitchell’s considerable efforts to circumscribe his claim and the relief sought
by limiting the nature of the goods in issue, by agreeing to stop and declare at
Canadian Customs and by limiting the relief respecting trade to trade with other
First Nations outside the commercial mainstream, the Court saw this as Chief
Mitchell neglecting to invoke relevant Aboriginal activities and thus artificially
and unjustifiably limiting his claim and his relief sought. The Chief Justice
announced that :
It may be tempting for a claimant or a court to tailor the right claimed to the contours of the specific act at issue. In this case, for example, Chief Mitchell seeks to
limit the scope of his claimed trading rights by designating specified trading partners. Originally, he claimed the right to trade with other First Nations in Canada.
After the Federal Court of Appeal decision, he further limited his claim to trade
with First Nations in Quebec and Ontario. These self-imposed limitations may represent part of Chief Mitchell’s commendable strategy of negotiating with the gov-

34
The trial judge wrote:
The women who decided what goods would be brought across the border interpreted personal goods as being food products and household appliances. The rest of the food and personal items were for trade. As stated earlier, the motor oil was destined for Jock’s Store.
Chief Mitchell testified that ninety-nine percent of the clientele at Jock’s Store are from the
community of Akwesasne. The store sells groceries, household items, food products, and
anything else that the community desires. It is regarded as an institution by the residents on
Cornwall Island. Customs officers go in the store occasionally for small items. However,
anyone coming from Canada to the store must pay a toll of $2.50 each way; non-Akwesasne
residents rarely pay the toll to shop at Jock’s Store. Chief Mitchell described the most expensive item in Jock’s Store as a pair of work gloves. Chief Mitchell further testified that
the goods supplied in the store are for the community of Akwesasne. If community members were unable to get the goods they needed at the store because of sales to a non-native,
the store owner would have to answer to the community.
Mitchell Fed. Court, [1997] 4 C.N.L.R. 103, at 110 (F.C.T.D.). (Jock’s Store is a community store in Akwesasne).
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ernment and minimizing the potential effects on its border control. However, narrowing the claim cannot narrow the aboriginal practice relied upon, which is what
defines the right. The essence of the alleged Mohawk tradition was not to bring
goods across the St. Lawrence River to trade with designated communities, but
rather to simply bring goods to trade.35

In fact, what Chief Mitchell had done in framing his case and in pursuing it
through the Federal Court of Canada was to make every effort to ask the courts
for declarations regarding an exercise of rights which reflected and respected
concerns for health and security, which reflected and respected concerns regarding disclosure of goods at Canada Customs and, in regard to the trade issue
(and here is the great irony), which reflected and respected the evidence before
the Court on the historical trade patterns of the Mohawks.
On this latter point, it is difficult to see what the Chief Justice meant when
she wrote “however, narrowing the claim cannot narrow the Aboriginal practice
relied upon which is what defines the right”. 36 After trial and the hearing before
the Federal Court of Appeal, the claim in regard to trade with other First Nations had been narrowed precisely to reflect the Aboriginal practice relied upon
as revealed by the evidence.
In any event, it seems a trifle unfair to Aboriginal litigants that after years of
being told by the Supreme Court of Canada and the courts below that only
claims cast specifically as to people, site and activity can be adjudicated by the
courts (Kruger and Manual, Van der Peet, Adams, Côté, Pamajewon),37 they
are now instructed that their claims and the relief sought must embrace the
totality of “relevant” Aboriginal practice at the time of contact. For some reason, the Mohawks’ Aboriginal practice of travelling throughout their territory
with personal and community goods was not relevant in characterizing Chief
Mitchell’s claim. On the other hand, the full range of pre-contact Aboriginal
activity, which included for Binnie J. “pre-contact warrior activities” and “engaging in military adventures on Canadian territory”,38 should have been included as integral elements in Chief Mitchell’s claim.
Professor Walters rushed to the defence of plaintiffs and their counsel in this
context stating:
35

Mitchell SCC, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 911, at para. 20. It should be noted that contrary to what the
Chief Justice here stated, Chief Mitchell “limited” his claim before the Federal Court of Appeal and
this was acknowledged appreciatively by Letourneau J.A. in the Federal Court of Appeal, Mitchell
Fed. Court Appeal, supra, note 32, at para. 20.
36
Mitchell SCC, ibid., at para. 20
37
Kruger v. The Queen, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 104; Van der Peet, supra, note 27; R. v. Adams,
[1996] 3 S.C.R. 101 [hereinafter Adams]; R. v. Coté, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 139 [hereinafter Coté]; R. v.
Pamajewon, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 821 [hereinafter Pamajewon].
38
Mitchell SCC, supra, note 35, at para. 153.
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In relation to aboriginal rights, however, the Court asserts the discretion to recharacterize the claim. Says McLachlin C.J. in Mitchell, it is “tempting” for the
claimant “to tailor the right” to their advantage, as if there is something morally
wrong about framing one’s action in a manner that might lead to success. In fact,
lawyers are under a professional obligation to do so; it is not a temptation but, one
could say, an obligation upon the lawyer and a right of the claimant to “tailor the
right” to achieve success.39

We will leave it at that.
The Chief Justice had not finished with the re-characterization of Chief
Mitchell’s claim. She stated: “In another attempt at limitation, Chief Mitchell
denies that his claim entails the right to pass freely over the border, i.e. mobility
rights.”40 She is quite right. In his factum before the Supreme Court, Chief
Mitchell stated:
The right at issue in this Appeal, as determined after adjudication by two levels of
the Federal Court of Canada, is clearly a right which applies when and if the Respondent enters into Canada. When the right at issue is properly understood, the
Appellant’s arguments on sovereignty and characterization fall away. 41

As we have seen, the judgment of the Federal Court of Appeal under review
before the Supreme Court of Canada clearly demonstrated that the justices of
the Court of Appeal understood that Chief Mitchell was not invoking a mobility
right. In any event, if the order of the Federal Court of Appeal had seemed
ambiguous to the Supreme Court on the matter of mobility, it would not have
been a difficult matter to have modified it so as to ensure that no such ambiguity remained. After all, the three justices of the Court of Appeal understood the
plaintiffs’ position that mobility was not in issue and Chief Mitchell had stated
it unequivocally in his submissions to the Supreme Court.
3. Assessing the Weight to be Given to the Evidence Led
The Supreme Court of Canada has repeatedly held that findings of fact
reached by the trial judge, including findings of fact based upon inference, can
only be reversed if the trial judge has made a “palpable and overriding error”.42

39
Walters, “The Right to Cross a River?: Aboriginal Rights in the Mitchell Case” prepared
for the Toronto Conference of the Pacific Business and Law Institute, October 25, 2001, at 10.
40
Mitchell SCC, supra note 35, at para. 22.
41
Mitchell v. M.N.R., SCC, ibid., Respondent’s Factum, para. 23.
42
Van der Peet, supra, note 27; Delgamuukw, supra, note 23; Schwartz v. Canada, [1996] 1
S.C.R. 254.
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Very recently the Court has re-articulated the many and sound reasons for
this rule, incorporating language from a judgment of the United States Supreme
Court:
The rationale for deference to the original finder of fact is not limited to the superiority of the trial judge’s position to make determinations of credibility. The trial
judge’s major role is the determination of fact, and with experience in fulfilling that
role comes expertise. Duplication of the trial judge’s efforts in the court of appeals
would very likely contribute only negligibly to the accuracy of fact determination
at a huge cost in diversion of judicial resources. In addition, the parties to a case on
appeal have already been forced to concentrate their energies and resources on persuading the trial judge that their account of the facts is the correct one; requiring
them to persuade three more judges at the appellate level is requiring too much. As
the Court has stated in a different context, the trial on the merits should be “the
‘main event’ … rather than a ‘tryout on the road.’” … For these reasons, review of
factual findings under the clearly-erroneous standard — with its deference to the
trier of fact — is the rule, not the exception.
Further comments regarding the advantages possessed by the trial judge have been
made by R. D. Gibbens in “Appellate Review of Findings of Fact” (1992), 13 Adv.
Q. 445, at p. 446:
The trial judge is said to have an expertise in assessing and weighing the
facts developed at trial. Similarly, the trial judge has also been exposed to
the entire case. The trial judge has sat through the entire case and his ultimate judgment reflects this total familiarity with the evidence. The insight gained by the trial judge who has lived with the case for several
days, weeks or even months may be far deeper than that of the Court of
Appeal whose view of the case is much more limited and narrow, often
being shaped and distorted by the various orders or rulings being challenged.43

It is striking that the focus of the Supreme Court’s analysis in Mitchell was
on reviewing, re-evaluating and discounting particular items in the evidentiary
record. This appears inconsistent with the principles articulated in Housen v.
Nikolaisen, especially given that the trial in Mitchell lasted over 30 days. The
majority of the Federal Court of Appeal, in contrast, appreciated the trial
judge’s handling of the “totality” of the evidence.44

43
Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33, paras. 13-14. At the beginning of this passage the
Court is quoting the United States Supreme Court in Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564
(1985), at pp. 574-75. See also note 46.
44
Mitchell Fed. Court Appeal, supra, note 32, Letourneau J.A., at para. 41 and Sexton J.A.,
at para. 47. Over 25 days of evidence was led at trial. The complete record, including expert reports
and transcripts from the trial is close to 100 volumes of material. In accordance with the Rules of
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With respect to archaeological evidence, for example, the Supreme Court
discounted evidence that the Mohawks traded in copper which originated on the
north shore of Lake Superior because it found that the evidence only showed
that the copper originated on the north shore of Lake Superior and not that the
Mohawks obtained the copper through direct trading with their northern
neighbours. The Court discounted a second archaeological document because it
only provided evidence in north-south trade in a single item — this the Supreme Court found was not sufficiently compelling.
With respect to this aspect of the evidence, we note simply that the Court did
not find that the trial judge had in any way erred in taking into account the
archaeological evidence — it simply disputed the weight which he (and the
majority of the Court of Appeal) had placed upon it. It is also striking that,
while the Court made much of what it saw as a contradiction in McKeown J.’s
finding of an Aboriginal right on the basis of “little direct evidence”, the Court
also found that: “McKeown J. correctly observed that indisputable evidence is
not required to establish an aboriginal right. Neither must the claim be established on the basis of direct evidence of pre-contact practices, customs and
traditions, which is inevitably scarce. Either requirement would ‘preclude in
practice any successful claim for the existence’ of an aboriginal right”. 45
If the evidentiary inquiry mandated by the Van der Peet test is so flexible
that an appellate court can re-evaluate the weight to be accorded to evidence
which, by its very nature, is scarce, then what has become of the principle that
appellate courts owe considerable deference to findings made by the trial judge
concerning the facts which prove, or fail to prove, an Aboriginal right? 46 The
latter principle is, in theory, affirmed in the Mitchell decision.47 In effect, however, it was clearly jettisoned.
It is early to say what the effects of the Mitchell decision will be on the integrity of the trial process. It is safe to predict, however, that both plaintiffs and
defendants will be inclined to rely upon the judgment to argue that, at least in
cases concerning issues of Aboriginal rights, appellate courts may and, indeed
should, review and re-evaluate the weight given to the evidence by a trial judge.

the Supreme Court, a very much condensed application record of some six volumes was filed
before the Supreme Court of Canada and one copy of the entire case was sent up from the Court of
Appeal.
45
Mitchell SCC, supra, note 35, at para. 52, quoting Van der Peet, supra, note 27, at para. 62
[emphasis added].
46
A principle reaffirmed in both Van der Peet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507, and Delgamuukw,
[1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010.
47
Mitchell SCC, supra, note 35, at para. 51.
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III. THE SOVEREIGN INCOMPATIBILITY TEST —
ONE BULLET DODGED
At the Supreme Court of Canada, the Crown invited the Court to adopt a test
related to compatibility with Crown sovereignty that would, if accepted, seriously compromise a great deal of the work of the Supreme Court and other
courts over the past several decades in examining the promise of section 35 of
the Constitution Act, 1982.48 The Chief Justice succinctly stated the Crown’s
position in her reasons:
... I add a note, however, on the government’s contention that s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 extends constitutional protection only to those aboriginal practices, customs and traditions that are compatible with the historical and modern exexercise of Crown sovereignty. Pursuant to this argument, any Mohawk practice of
cross-border trade, even if established on the evidence, would be barred from recognition under s. 35(1) as incompatible with the Crown’s sovereign interest in
regulating its borders.49

The Chief Justice, quite rightly in our view, declined the invitation of the
Crown on this point and stated that in the past the Court had:
...affirmed the doctrines of extinguishment, infringement and justification as the
appropriate framework for resolving conflicts between aboriginal rights and competing claims, including claims based on Crown sovereignty.50

In essence, the Crown’s contention was that in the case of Aboriginal activities deemed to be incompatible with the historical and modern exercise of
Crown sovereignty, no right would crystallize. We can see how problematic
this would be for establishing virtually any Aboriginal right in the context of
the Court’s contention in Mitchell that the entire bundle of Aboriginal activities
must be pleaded as rights. Justice Binnie in his minority reasons raised the
spectre of Mohawk military pre-contact activity and the fact that the evidence
showed in this case that Mohawks regularly exploited lands in what is now
Canada for many purposes including that of war. Indeed, this had already been
acknowledged by the Supreme Court in R. v. Adams, a case in which the Court,
notwithstanding direct linkages between Mohawk warrior activity and fishing
activity, still felt comfortable recognizing the specific pre-contact activity of
fishing as giving rise to an Aboriginal right to fish.51 There was no suggestion

48
49
50
51

Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075.
Mitchell SCC, supra, note 35 at para. 61.
Ibid., at para. 63.
Adams, supra, note 37, at para. 44-46.
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in Adams that warring activities would have to be grafted on to the activity of
fishing in Lake St. Francis.
In Mitchell, however, Binnie J. returned to the pre-contact warrior activity of
Mohawks:
I take an illustration from the evidence in this case. The trial judge showed that
pre-contact the Mohawks, as a military force, moved under their own command
through what is now parts of southern Ontario and southern Quebec. The evidence,
taken as a whole, suggests that military values were “a defining feature of Mohawk
[or Iroquois] culture”, to use my colleague’s expression at para. 54. Indeed, the
Mohawk warrior tradition has its adherents to this day. As previously noted, the
trial judge at p. 35 thought the Mohawks’ military activities in the St. Lawrence River
Valley probably got in the way of their trading activities:
[I]t is difficult to see how an army would engage in trade with their enemies while in pursuit of them.
However, important as they may have been to the Mohawk identity as a people,
it could not be said, in my view, that pre-contact warrior activities gave rise under
successor regimes to a legal right under s. 35(1) to engage in military adventures
on Canadian territory. Canadian sovereign authority has, as one of its inherent
characteristics, a monopoly on the lawful use of military force within its territory. I
do not accept that the Mohawks could acquire under s. 35(1) a legal right to deploy
a military force in what is now Canada, as and when they choose to do so, even if
the warrior tradition was to be considered a defining feature of pre-contact Mohawk
society. Section 35(1) should not be interpreted to throw on the Crown the burden
of demonstrating subsequent extinguishment by “clear and plain” measures (Gladstone, supra, at para. 31) of a “right” to organize a private army, or a requirement to
justify such a limitation after 1982 under the Sparrow standard. This example, remote as it is from the particular claim advanced in this case, usefully illustrates the
principled limitation flowing from sovereign incompatibility in the s. 35(1) analysis.52

Justice Binnie concluded:
In my opinion, sovereign incompatibility continues to be an element in the s.
35(1) analysis, albeit a limitation that will be sparingly applied. For the most part,
the protection of practices, traditions and customs that are distinctive to aboriginal
cultures in Canada does not raise legitimate sovereignty issues at the definitional
stage.53

The problem we see with Binnie J.’s test is twofold.

52
53

Mitchell SCC, supra, note 35, at paras. 152, 153 [emphasis added].
Ibid., at para. 154.
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First, the doctrines of extinguishment and sovereign incompatibility are too
definitive and irrevocable. While the matter has not yet been settled by the
courts in Canada, one wonders whether a right that has been held to be extinguished by the Supreme Court of Canada could possibly be resurrected in a
future age under other conditions. The same applies with respect to the doctrine
of sovereign incompatibility which suggests that a right did not crystallize
during the complex process of sovereign succession or the merging of sovereignties. Again, could such a right later be found on the basis of revised judicial
analysis or newly understood history to have in fact survived sovereign succession or the merging of sovereignties? In the post-1982 constitutional context,
Binnie J.’s theory introduces a measure of vulnerability for rights understood to
have received protection through section 35.
The second difficulty we have is that the test is subjective, is applied without
evidence and depends upon the referents of time and place.54 It involves two
stages of characterization — characterizing the right in issue and then characterizing the sovereignty to which the right is alleged to be incompatible.
We see the first problem in Mitchell where, as developed above, the Court in
our respectful opinion, mischaracterized the right being claimed. This enabled
the minority justices, after endorsing the “sovereign incompatibility” test, to
review the national and international law on the matter of the movement of
persons and goods across international boundaries and to find that, inherent to
national sovereignty, was the power to control the entrance of persons and
goods into a state. This made it easier for them to then find that the recharacterized right, expressed as an “international trading/mobility right”, did
not meet the sovereign incompatibility test. Whether this is so, or not, is entirely irrelevant to the case that Chief Mitchell put to the courts for adjudication.
The second problem relates to the characterization of the attributes of sovereignty. There was a time in the western world when church and state were one
and many a heresy was considered incompatible with the sovereignty of the
state. Indeed, we should remind ourselves that certain attributes of Afghan
“sovereignty” under the Taliban may have been rendered totally irrelevant only
in the last several months and that many activities which would have been
candidates for sovereign incompatibility in that country on September 11, 2001
are now being exercised and indeed celebrated.
While these are perhaps extreme examples of shifting standards considered
to be essential to state sovereign interests, they do represent past realities, not
future speculation. The reality of the interface between Canadian sovereignty
54

46.

See the dissenting reasons of McLachlin J. (as she then was) in Van der Peet, supra, note
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and the claims of Aboriginal peoples has also shifted in the past, albeit less
dramatically, and this process has accelerated with the development of the
international regime for indigenous peoples55 and, of course, the introduction of
section 35 into the Constitution of Canada. 56 One interesting manifestation of
this would be the changing understanding of the relationship between Canada’s
international obligations and her obligations towards the Aboriginal peoples of
Canada in the context of the application of the Migratory Birds Convention of
1916.57
The Crown’s international treaty power would surely be said to be an essential condition of statehood and an integral element of Canadian sovereignty.
The Crown may enter into and has entered into international treaties in which it
commits itself to protect certain species of wildlife. Prior to 1982, the position
taken by the Crown was that if the exercise of this aspect of sovereignty conflicted with Aboriginal practices, those practices would have to be considered
irreconcilable with Crown sovereignty. The Crown in Right of the United
Kingdom entered into just such a treaty with the United States of America in
1916, with respect to migratory birds — the 1916 Migratory Birds Convention.
Parliament enacted the Migratory Birds Convention Act58 to give effect to the
international convention in Canada prohibiting the hunting of migratory birds
during certain times of the year and regulating various other activities related to
migratory birds and their habitats. These prohibitions conflicted with, and
indeed were irreconcilable with, Aboriginal and treaty rights to hunt.

55
Referred to to some extent by Binnie J. in Mitchell SCC, supra, note 35, at paras. 81-83.
See for further illustration: International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. res. 2200A
(XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16), at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered
into force Mar. 23, 1976; Convention concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent
Countries (ILO No. 169), 72 ILO Official Bull. 59, entered into force Sept. 5, 1991; Report of the
Nuuk Meeting of Experts to review the experience of countries in the operation of schemes of
internal self-government for Indigenous peoples, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1992/42, 25 November 1991;
Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/2/Add.1 (1994);
Proposed American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Approved by the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights on February 26, 1997, at its 1333rd session, 95th Regular
Session), OEA/Ser/L/V/.II.95 Doc.6 (1997); Economic and Social Council Resolution 2000/22,
U.N. Doc. E/RES/2000/22, 28 July 2000 establishing the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues;
Mayagna (Sumo) Community of Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., August
31, 2001; Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights Fact Sheet No.9 (Rev.1), The Rights
of Indigenous Peoples at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu6/2/fs9.htm.
56
Adams, supra, note 37, at 121-122 and Côté, supra, note 37, at 174.
57
1916 Convention Between the United Kingdom and the United States of America for the
Protection of Migratory Birds in Canada and the United States, signed in Washington, August 16,
1916.
58
Migratory Birds Convention Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. M-7.
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In cases decided prior to 1982 dealing with treaty rights of Aboriginal persons to hunt migratory birds, it was held by the Courts, sometimes with much
regret,59 that treaty rights were not justiciable in the face of conflicting federal
regulatory provisions. During that same period, Canada took the position in
treaty negotiations with Aboriginal peoples that it was bound under international law not to recognize the Aboriginal right to hunt migratory birds year
round.60
Two things happened following the enactment of section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. First, the courts began to read down the sovereign international
obligations of Canada under the Convention and to declare and secure Aboriginal and treaty rights to hunt birds in purported violation of the Convention. Of
considerable significance here is the fact that in so doing the courts held that
there had been no pre-1982 extinguishment of the Aboriginal rights thought at
the time to be incompatible with Canada’s sovereign commitments under international treaty. At the same time, in clear confirmation that reconciliation of
Crown sovereignty with pre-existing Aboriginal societies and their activities is
a reciprocal exercise, Canada initiated negotiations with the United States of
America to amend the 1916 Convention to bring it into line with the Aboriginal
and treaty rights of the Aboriginal peoples of Canada. Parliament repealed the
Migratory Birds Convention Act replacing it with the Migratory Birds Convention Act 1994, to implement the amended Convention. 61
So surely it can be asked: by whom and at what point in the historical continuum is the decree made that an activity is so incompatible with state sovereignty that it cannot possibly ever result in rights or in title?
Furthermore, any argument about sovereign incompatibility is going to be a
purely theoretical construct in the absence of evidence of how the exercise of
the Aboriginal right would be incompatible with Canadian sovereignty. In
Mitchell, the essence of the Crown’s argument on sovereign incompatibility
was that any Mohawk practice of cross-border trade was incompatible with the
Crown’s sovereign interest in regulating its borders. This is an argument which
59
See Johnson J. of the Northwest Territories Court of Appeal in R. v. Sikyea (1964), 43
D.L.R. (2d) 150, at 158 (N.W.T.C.A.); affd [1964] S.C.R. 642; R. v. George, [1966] S.C.R. 267.
60
See, for example, James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement, s. 24, paras. 24.14.2,
24.14.7; The Western Arctic Claim — The Inuvialuit Final Agreement, ss. 14(11), 14(12), 14(37),
14(38); Umbrella Final Agreement between the Government of Canada, the Council for Yukon
Indians and the Government of the Yukon, ch. 16, paras. 16.3.9 and 16.3.12; Sahtu Dene and Metis
Comprehensive Land Claim Agreement, para. 13.3.5 and the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement, art.
5, part 9, para. 5.9.4.
61
Protocol Between Canada and the United States of America Amending the 1916 Convention for the Protection of Migratory Birds in Canada and the United States, signed on December
14, 1995, ratified on September 9, 1999, preamble, s. II 4(a); Migratory Birds Convention Act 1994,
at ss. 2(3), 4, and 12(2).
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might, if proved, justify limitation of the exercise of an Aboriginal right and as
such properly belongs at the “justification” stage of the inquiry into Aboriginal
rights.62
As will be developed further, the only appropriate approach to assertions of
incompatibility between Aboriginal rights and Crown sovereignty is to exercise
control, if control is necessary, at the level of the exercise of rights, not the
existence of those rights. What is more, the law and its interpreters should
strive to identify and achieve reconciliation between apparently competing
claims rather than to seek out incompatibility.

IV. THE APPLICATION OF THE VAN DER PEET TEST AND
“INDIANNESS”
A review of the work of the Court in attempting to reconcile Aboriginal
rights and Aboriginal title with Crown sovereignty reveals a spectrum. At one
end of the spectrum are situated what are considered to be the classical traditional activities of Aboriginal peoples — hunting, fishing, trapping and gathering. At the other end of the spectrum are situated what are perceived to be
commercial, industrial and economic activities. At the traditional end of the
spectrum, reconciliation has meant recognition and protection of Aboriginal
rights and title and an accommodation by the Crown. As we move along the
spectrum, however, the balance shifts and as we arrive at the other end reconciliation results in the reading down of Aboriginal rights and title in favour of
Crown sovereignty. This, of course, is the “integral to a distinctive society” test
being applied in a rather self-serving way.
Contrasting the Supreme Court decision in R. v. Adams with Mitchell v.
M.N.R. is instructive as the two cases involved the same people — Mohawks
— and essentially the same territory — southern Quebec and Ontario. In Adams
Lamer C.J. reviewed the expert evidence and concluded as follows:
The general picture presented by the testimony of Parent and Trigger, when considered together, is that prior to 1603 it is unclear which aboriginal peoples made
use of the St. Lawrence Valley, although there is evidence to suggest that at that
time the lands were occupied in part by a group of Iroquois unrelated to the Mohawks. From 1603 to the 1650s the area was the subject of conflict between various
aboriginal peoples, including the Mohawks. During this period the Mohawks
clearly fished for food in the St. Lawrence River, either because the Mohawks ex-

62
This was an argument made by counsel for the Mohawks of Akwesasne before the Supreme Court of Canada. Interestingly, Manitoba supported this argument in its factum and agreed,
on this one issue, with the Mohawks’ contention that sovereign incompatibility was essentially an
argument on justification.
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ercised military control over the region and adopted the territory as fishing and
hunting grounds, or because the Mohawks conducted military campaigns in the region during which they were required to rely on the fish in the St. Lawrence River
and Lake St. Francis for sustenance.
This general picture, regardless of the uncertainty which arises because of the
witnesses’ conflicting characterizations of the Mohawks’ control and use over this
area from 1603 to 1632, supports the trial judge’s conclusion that the Mohawks
have an aboriginal right to fish for food in Lake St. Francis. Either because reliance
on the fish in the St. Lawrence River for food was a necessary part of their campaigns of war, or because the lands of this area constituted Mohawk hunting and
fishing grounds, the evidence presented at trial demonstrates that fishing for food in
the St. Lawrence River and, in particular, in Lake St. Francis, was a significant part
of the life of the Mohawks from a time dating from at least 1603 and the arrival of
Samuel de Champlain into the area. The fish were not significant to the Mohawks
for social or ceremonial reasons; however, they were an important and significant
source of subsistence for the Mohawks.
… No aboriginal group will ever be able to provide conclusive evidence of what
took place prior to contact (and here the witnesses agree that it is unclear which
aboriginal peoples were fishing in the fishing area prior to 1603); evidence that at
contact a custom was a significant part of their distinctive culture should be sufficient to demonstrate that prior to contact that custom was also a significant part of
their distinctive culture. The appellant here has clearly demonstrated that at the
time of contact fishing in the St. Lawrence River and Lake St. Francis for food was
a significant part of the life of the Mohawks. This is sufficient to demonstrate that it
was so prior to contact.63

Contrast this with how the Court dealt with evidence respecting the same
people and the same territory in Mitchell, evidence found sufficient by the trial
judge and the Federal Court of Appeal. The Court is obviously less comfortable
with the idea that trading practices and northerly travel coincided prior to the
arrival of Europeans than that fishing practices and northerly travel coincided in
that period. In Mitchell, the Chief Justice wrote:
While the ancestral home of the Mohawks lay in the Mohawk Valley of presentday New York State, the evidence establishes that, before the arrival of Europeans,
they travelled north on occasion across the St. Lawrence River. We may assume
they travelled with goods to sustain themselves. There was also ample evidence before McKeown J. to support his finding that trade was a central, distinguishing feature of the Iroquois in general and the Mohawks in particular. This evidence
indicates the Mohawks were well situated for trade, and engaged in small-scale ex-
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change with other First Nations. A critical question in this case, however, is
whether these trading practices and northerly travel coincided prior to the arrival of
Europeans; that is, does the evidence establish an ancestral Mohawk practice of
transporting goods across the St. Lawrence River for the purposes of trade? Only if
this ancestral practice is established does it become necessary to determine whether
it is an integral feature of Mohawk culture with continuity to the present day. 64

After a careful reading of the judgments in Adams and Mitchell it is not clear
how the evidence accepted by the Court in Adams was that much more probative than that in Mitchell.65
Other examples of harsher scrutiny being applied by the Court when it
comes to so-called commercial or economic activities are to be found in the
jurisprudence.66
The Supreme Court has previously signalled a reluctance to include so-called
“commercial activities” within the meaning of Aboriginal rights in its judgment
in R. v. Pamajewon.67 In that case the fact situation and the right claimed involved gambling — in the words of the Court “high stakes gambling” — and a
claim that the Aboriginal claimants’ right to self-government encompassed the
right to regulate on-reserve gambling.
These claims were rejected outright. While the Court was prepared to assume, without deciding, that section 35(1) included self-government rights, it
insisted that those rights must be proven in accordance with the “integral to the
distinctive culture” test. The Court rejected the argument that a more general
right to manage Aboriginal reserve lands could encompass the right to organize
and regulate high stakes gambling.
In Pamajewon,68 the Court expressed its agreement with an observation
made by the trial judge that “commercial lotteries such as bingo are a twentieth
century phenomena and nothing of the kind existed amongst aboriginal peoples
and was never part of the means by which those societies were traditionally
sustained or socialized”. Thus, any commercial activity which the Crown can
successfully characterize as “a twentieth century phenomenon” may not come
within the ambit of Aboriginal rights protected by section 35(1). 69 Indeed, any
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Mitchell SCC, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 911, at para. 41 (emphasis added).
Adams, supra, note 63, at paras. 44, 45; Mitchell SCC, ibid., at paras. 48, 49, 101.
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Pamajewon, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 821. See also Morse, “Permafrost Rights: Aboriginal SelfGovernment and the Supreme Court in R. v. Pamajewon” (1997), 42 McGill L.J. 1011.
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Ibid., at para. 29.
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For a recent example see R. v. Marshall (2001), 191 N.S.R. (2d) 323, at para. 90-95, affd
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contention that Aboriginal rights encompass commercial activity is met with
harsh scrutiny.70
This propensity to limit the scope of Aboriginal rights to matters outside of
the “commercial mainstream” is also evident in recent decisions from the Federal Court of Appeal concerning the ambit of section 87 of the Indian Act. In
these decisions, that Court has limited the protection of income from taxation
so that income which is earned in the “commercial mainstream” is not considered to be located on reserve. Such income is, therefore, not tax exempt in
virtue of section 87.71 Thus in its recent decision in Shilling v. Canada, the
Federal Court of Appeal stated:
That an Indian is employed on a reserve is an indication that he or she is acquiring
employment income as an Indian qua Indian, in employment integral to the life of
the reserve: Folster, supra, at paragraph 14. The opposite would also be true, that
is, employment off-reserve is an indication that the Indian is acquiring employment
income in the commercial mainstream.72

This dichotomy between “Indian activities” which are protected by section
87, and “commercial mainstream” activities, which are not, has its origins in
statements made by the Supreme Court of Canada in Mitchell v. Peguis Indian
Band. That case was about the meaning and scope of sections 87, 89 and 90 of
the Indian Act. For the majority, La Forest J. stated of those sections:
… the purpose of the legislation is not to remedy the economically disadvantaged
position of Indians by ensuring that Indians may acquire, hold, and deal with property in the commercial mainstream on different terms than their fellow citizens. An
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The irony is, of course, that commercial dealings were at the heart of Aboriginal/European
relations from contact as evidenced by the importance of the fur trade in its many manifestations
from coast to coast to coast. Ray, Indians in the Fur Trade; Their Role as Hunters, Trappers and
Middlemen in the Lands Southwest of Hudson Bay (1974), Chapter 11, especially at 205-212;
Milloy, The Plains Cree: Trade Diplomacy and War, 1790 to 1870 (1988), at 105.
The idea of restricting Aboriginal commercial activity was born when fear of competition
with settler activity arose. This occurred even in the face of treaty promises to assist in economic
development. Dr. Carl Beal has noted “Access to markets was controlled by the Indian Agent
through the permit system. The Indian agent regulated both sales and purchases by Indians. That
system had been authorized by the Indian Act of 1876, reinforced by an Order in Council in 1880,
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Hayter Reed strictly regulated Indian access to farm equipment. Beal, Money, Markets and Economic Development in Saskatchewan Indian Reserve Communities, 1870-1930s (1994), at 186-187.
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Southwind v. Canada, [1998] 2 C.N.L.R. 233 (F.C.A.); Recalma v. Canada, [1998] 2
C.N.L.R. 279 (F.C.A.); Indian Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-5.
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examination of the decisions bearing on these sections confirms that Indians who
acquire and deal in property outside lands reserved for their use, deal with it on the
same basis as all other Canadians.73

It would be erroneous to apply an approach developed with respect to the
statutory protection in section 87 to limit the scope of constitutionally protected
rights, and we do not mean to suggest that the “commercial mainstream” criterion which has been developed in the case-law on section 87 was applied by the
Court in Mitchell. However, Mitchell was another case in which activities
deemed by the Court to be commercial in nature appear to have been scrutinized more closely than activities which were generally understood to be associated with “Indianness”, such as hunting and fishing.74
However relevant the concepts of the “commercial mainstream” as opposed
to “Indianness” may be to the content of section 87 of the Indian Act,75 they are
irrelevant to the issue of Aboriginal rights. It cannot seriously be argued that
Aboriginal societies in pre-contact times did not have an economy, or that they
did not govern themselves. Yet, by placing the burden of proof upon Aboriginal
claimants to prove in minute detail the historical activity and practices which
form the modern right today, the Van der Peet test forces us to engage in an
inquiry which essentially presumes that Aboriginal nations did not have an
economy or that they did not govern themselves. The test certainly attributes
virtually no weight to those cultural and societal markers. The particularization
of the right, which is mandated by the test, forces us to dissect culture and
society into its smallest elements in order to determine if the exact practice
required to prove the right being exercised today prevailed four hundred years
ago rather than focusing attention on viable and dynamic cultures and societies
in which such activities would have naturally occurred or evolved.
Inevitably, the rights which are most often presumed to have their origins in
pre-contact times are those which involve traditional subsistence activities:
hunting and fishing for food and cultural needs. All other activities are subject
to a tremendous burden of proof in order to be established as a right. 76 Ironi-
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[1990] 2 S.C.R. 85, at 131.
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cally, in Mitchell, at least three of the provincial interveners before the Supreme
Court of Canada took the position that trading rights could not be an Aboriginal
right as all human beings historically engaged in trade, and there was nothing
particularly “Aboriginal” about it.77 This demonstrates not only the extent to
which presumptions regarding “Indianness” have been subsumed into the Van
der Peet test but also how that test effectively marginalizes Aboriginal culture
and society.

V. THE VAN DER PEET TEST AND CONTEMPORARY
CROWN/ABORIGINAL NEGOTIATIONS
There exists an intriguing dichotomy between the rights discourse and analysis enshrined in the Van der Peet test and that promoted by government in
negotiations with Aboriginal peoples. The focus of the Van der Peet test is on
the distant past — the period of first contact between a First Nation and Europeans. In Mitchell, this meant that considerable evidence and analysis was
devoted to a time period some four hundred years ago.
The determining factors in the decision of the Supreme Court in Mitchell
were not what was culturally meaningful to the Mohawks of Akwesasne and
their ancestors.78 Trade with other First Nations was a central distinguishing
feature of Mohawk society. But, that fact alone was apparently insufficient to
ground the right in this case, rather the Court required evidence that such trade
took place in a northerly direction. The focus is on the cultural significance of
the geographic direction of the activity some 400 years ago, rather then the
importance of trade to Mohawk society. 79
The Van der Peet test, as it was applied in Mitchell, fails to take into account
any relevant contemporary factors. The test is utterly frozen in time. It requires
the judiciary to peer back into a time centuries ago to determine what was
culturally relevant and significant to a specific people at that time, and to define
contemporary rights on that basis. 80
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It is important to recall that the Mohawk Territory of Akwesasne is traversed
by the international border and in puzzling ways. In order to cross from the
Quebec side of the reserve to the Ontario side it is necessary to cross the international border and international customs and immigration posts, but to cross
from the Quebec side into the New York side there is no customs and immigration post and indeed no discernible boundary line. Everyday life in Akwesasne
involves coping with these multiple, superimposed jurisdictions. This reality
was very much a focus of the evidence at trial in Mitchell.
How can the Van der Peet test be meaningful to the contemporary aspirations and realities of First Nations communities, such as the Mohawks of Akwesasne, when those everyday realities are ignored at the expense of a
historical investigation into their ancestors’ precise activities some 400 years
ago?
If, as the Supreme Court has implied in Pamajewon, activities which are
characterized as “twentieth century phenomena” can never form the subject of
an Aboriginal right, there is little content to the Aboriginal rights protected by
section 35(1) for Aboriginal peoples whose visions of and aspirations for their
societies and their future go beyond hunting, fishing and trapping for food and
social activities. How would this approach to judicial analysis of rights and
power be viewed in other areas of the law such as fundamental freedoms and
equality rights, the Charter and criminal law or federalism and judicial independence?
The rights analysis suggested by the Van der Peet test is rendered all the more
incongruous when it is contrasted with the contemporary discourse of the government of Canada in its evolving policy on Aboriginal peoples and in its negotiations with Aboriginal peoples through a continuing and constitutionally
mandated treaty process.
In negotiations with government on the exercise and implementation of Aboriginal rights, the focus is on the future. While the past is certainly still relevant
to matters such as title claims, negotiations over governance issues, economic
development and other matters are typically oriented towards the future. Generally, this is at the behest of the federal and provincial governments which do
not wish to focus on a past where Aboriginal rights were, more often than not,
honoured in the breach.81 Thus the 1997 policy paper Gathering Strength:
Canada’s Aboriginal Action Plan announced:
In developing its Aboriginal Action Plan, the Government of Canada sincerely
hopes and believes that Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people can develop a common vision for the future. This vision must include the means for Aboriginal people
to participate fully in the economic, political, cultural and social life of Canada in a
81
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manner which preserves and enhances the collective identities of their communities, and allows them to build for a better future. This can and will be achieved as
all parties accept, in a spirit of mutual respect and mutual responsibility, the challenge of strengthening the partnership between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal Canadians.82

Treaty negotiations today, whether on the inherent right to governance or territory and resources, are focused upon how rights will be exercised in a contemporary way and within the context of contemporary Canadian society.
While Aboriginal and Canadian government negotiators often disagree about
how the rights can be reconciled in this contemporary context, there is no question that the focus of this rights discourse is relevant and meaningful.
In Gathering Strength, we read the following under the heading “A Treaty
Relationship”:
A vision for the future should build on recognition of the rights of Aboriginal people and on the treaty relationship. Beginning almost 300 years ago, treaties were
signed between the British Crown and many First Nations living in what was to become Canada. These treaties between the Crown and First Nations are basic building blocks in the creation of our country. 83

In its Inherent Rights Policy, the government of Canada states:
The Government of Canada recognizes the inherent right of self-government as an
existing right within section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. It has developed an
approach to implementation that focuses on reaching practical and workable
agreements on how self-government will be exercised, rather than trying to define it in abstract terms. The Government believes that this approach is flexible and
will allow all interested parties to make meaningful progress in the realization of
Aboriginal self-government.84

While we would take issue with the Policy insofar as it limits negotiation of
the inherent right solely to matters which the Government of Canada unilaterally defines as “internal”, we note that the focus of negotiations, according to
the Policy, is on working out arrangements and structures for the contemporary
exercise of the rights.
Shin Imai, in a short commentary on the effects of the Mitchell decision, asserts that the approach adopted by the Supreme Court hampers negotiations
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because of its focus on recreating historical situations rather than contemporary
issues:
Why does this approach detrimentally affect negotiations? It does so by forcing the
parties to place all their energies into recreating a historical situation that existed
over four hundred years ago. There is little incentive to compromise on a historical
vision, especially if it is that vision of history which will determine the outcome of
litigation. The parties are not rewarded for attempting to make compromises or address the concerns of the other party.85

We are not suggesting that Aboriginal peoples should abandon litigation to
concentrate solely on negotiations. Negotiation and litigation work in tandem in
advancing Aboriginal claims,86 and it is clear that the Government of Canada
has often been moved from intractable negotiation positions through Aboriginal
victories in the courts.87 However, as long as the rights inquiry mandated by the
Van der Peet test remains resolutely focused on establishing and characterizing
events or activities prevailing hundreds of years ago at the expense of a discourse about the exercise of Aboriginal rights in the context of contemporary
Canadian society, it will not provide a solid foundation for negotiations. A
solution to this unfortunate state of affairs must be found.

VI. CONCLUSIONS: ALTERNATIVES TO THE VAN DER PEET RIGHTS
ANALYSIS
On numerous occasions the Court has referred to section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 as providing the constitutional framework for reconciliation of
the pre-existence of distinct Aboriginal societies occupying the land with
Crown sovereignty.88 This is a just and reasonable reading of the constitutional
provision and the spirit underlying that provision. In our respectful opinion,
however, the Court has proceeded from this point to develop a concept of reconciliation and a role for section 35 which is neither just or appropriate.
What the Court has proceeded to do, in fact, is to fashion reconciliation with
Crown sovereignty by defining and dissecting Aboriginal society virtually to
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Delgamuukw, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, at para. 186.
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the vanishing point in contemporary terms. Crown sovereignty, on the other
hand, is assumed to evolve, flourish and reflect contemporary reality.
We suggest that there is a better and a fairer way and that this better and
fairer way is found in the Court’s first judgment on the scope of section 35(1)
— R. v. Sparrow.89 The twin ideas which the Chief Justice and La Forest J.
appeared to be announcing in their reasons in Sparrow were, first, that on the
matter of the existence and scope of Aboriginal rights, section 35 implied an
accommodation by sovereign claims, not an accommodation towards such
claims; and, second, that legitimate sovereign concerns were to be accommodated with respect to the exercise of Aboriginal rights, not through denying
those rights. How else can we read the portion of the reasons of the Chief Justice and La Forest J. commencing at page 1102 in which they examine the
background of section 35(1)? In this portion of their reasons they commence by
juxtaposing early British policy towards the “Native” population based on
respect for the right to occupy their traditional lands as evidenced by the Royal
Proclamation of 1763 with the fact that from the outset there had never been
any doubt that sovereignty and legislative power to such lands vested in the
Crown.90 They then proceed to observe that: “For many years, the rights of the
Indians to their aboriginal lands — certainly as legal rights — were virtually
ignored.”91 Then they trace what they characterize as the “long and difficult
struggle in both the political forum and the courts for the constitutional recognition of aboriginal rights”.92 They find that section 35(1) represents the “culmination” of this struggle. And they quote Professor Lyon who suggests that
section 35 “calls for a just settlement for aboriginal peoples” and implies the
end of “the old rules of the game under which the Crown established courts of
law and denied those courts the authority to question sovereign claims made by
the Crown”.93 The placement of this passage by Professor Lyon in the reasons
in Sparrow surely can be construed as an acceptance by the Court that the just
settlement for Aboriginal peoples and the reconciliation mandated by section
35 implied for Aboriginal societies, not death by a thousand definitions, but
rather room to grow.

89

Sparrow, supra, note 81, at 1082, 1083 where the Chief Justice and La Forest J. opened
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This is borne out by the Court in Sparrow supporting the position of Hall J.
in Calder rather than Judson J. on the matter of the vulnerability of Aboriginal
rights to Crown power even prior to the enactment of section 35. The Chief
Justice and La Forest J. stated:
...That in Judson J.’s view was what had occurred in Calder, supra, where, as he
saw it, a series of statutes evinced a unity of intention to exercise a sovereignty inconsistent with any conflicting interest, including aboriginal title. But Hall J. in that
case stated (at p. 404) that “the onus of proving that the Sovereign intended to extinguish the Indian title lies on the respondent and that intention must be ‘clear and
plain’”. The test of extinguishment to be adopted, in our opinion, is that the Sovereign’s intention must be clear and plain if it is to extinguish an aboriginal right.94

At the same time, the Court in Sparrow provided the tools for the ongoing
reconciliation of Crown power with Crown duty and that was to suggest that,
with justification, the exercise of Aboriginal rights could be restrained through
government regulation.95
The Supreme Court of Canada’s first judgment on the origins and nature of
Indian title — and, by extension, all Aboriginal rights — was its judgment in
Calder in 1973. Six judges of the Court rejected the argument that upon the
“discovery” of North America by Europeans, all rights of the indigenous inhabitants were promptly extinguished or superseded. While three members of
the Court found that Indian title was subsequently extinguished by colonial
legislation, six members of the seven member bench held that Aboriginal, or
Indian, title was a pre-existing right which was not created by any colonial act.
What was significant was the fact of prior occupation, the fact in Judson J.’s
words that: “...when the settlers came, the Indians were there, organized in
societies and occupying the land as their forefathers had done for centuries.” 96
It is interesting that a reader of Lamer C.J.’s reasons in Van der Peet would
form an impression from the opening passages that the Chief Justice was
headed in the direction of Calder in his discussion as to what “Aboriginal”
meant in Aboriginal rights. For example, the Chief Justice wrote:
In my view, the doctrine of aboriginal rights exists, and is recognized and affirmed by s. 35(1), because of one simple fact: when Europeans arrived in North
America, aboriginal peoples were already here, living in communities on the land,
and participating in distinctive cultures, as they had done for centuries. It is this
fact, and this fact above all others, which separates aboriginal peoples from all
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other minority groups in Canadian society and which mandates their special legal,
and now constitutional, status.97

In fact, the Chief Justice in Van der Peet specifically acknowledged the contribution of Judson J. and Hall J. in Calder in this analysis and explained that
no distinction needed to be made between determining Aboriginal title as in
Calder and determining Aboriginal rights:
The position of Judson and Hall JJ. on the basis for aboriginal title is applicable
to the aboriginal rights recognized and affirmed by s. 35(1). Aboriginal title is the
aspect of aboriginal rights related specifically to aboriginal claims to land; it is the
way in which the common law recognizes aboriginal land rights. As such, the explanation of the basis of aboriginal title in Calder, supra, can be applied equally to
the aboriginal rights recognized and affirmed by s. 35(1). Both aboriginal title and
aboriginal rights arise from the existence of distinctive aboriginal communities occupying “the land as their forefathers had done for centuries” (p. 328).98

The Chief Justice in the early portion of his reasons in Van der Peet also
seems to consider important the dynamic character to Aboriginal rights. He
cites Professor Mark Walters as suggesting that the essence of Aboriginal rights
is their bridging of Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal cultures:
The challenge of defining aboriginal rights stems from the fact that they are
rights peculiar to the meeting of two vastly dissimilar legal cultures; consequently
there will always be a question about which legal culture is to provide the vantage
point from which rights are to be defined . . . . a morally and politically defensible
conception of aboriginal rights will incorporate both legal perspectives. 99

Immediately following this passage, the Chief Justice invokes Professor
Slattery and his suggestion that the law of Aboriginal rights: “is a form of
intersocietal law that evolved from long-standing practices linking the various
communities”.100
The Chief Justice sums up his review of Canadian, American and Australian
jurisprudence and the doctrine as follows:
The Canadian, American and Australian jurisprudence thus supports the basic
proposition put forward at the beginning of this section: the aboriginal rights recognized and affirmed by s. 35(1) are best understood as, first, the means by which
the Constitution recognizes the fact that prior to the arrival of Europeans in North
America the land was already occupied by distinctive aboriginal societies, and as,
second, the means by which that prior occupation is reconciled with the assertion of
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Crown sovereignty over Canadian territory. The content of aboriginal rights must
be directed at fulfilling both of these purposes; the next section of the judgment, as
well as that which follows it, will attempt to accomplish this task.101

We do not take issue with the two elements identified. In fact, they contain
the seeds of what we would consider to be a more appropriate approach which
acknowledges the constitutional recognition of pre-existing Aboriginal societies
and which leaves open the possibility of achieving reconciliation through appropriate exercise of rights rather than through dissecting cultures to establish
the existence of rights. The Supreme Court in Sparrow suggested the appropriate
tool over 10 years ago — the justification test.
Unfortunately, after this introduction, the Chief Justice moved immediately
to establish a test now known as the Van der Peet test which effectively retreats
from the Court’s approach in Calder and Sparrow by requiring Aboriginal
claimants to prove, amongst other things, (1) that when the settlers came they
were indeed living on the land; (2) the nature of their distinctive societies which
existed when the settlers came; (3) those elements that were “integral” to their
distinctive societies when the settlers came, (4) the manner in which they occupied the land when the settlers came; and (5) continuity between the historical
practices and the contemporary claims.
In Delgamuukw, the Chief Justice determined that a continuing substantial
connection between a people and a territory was sufficient to establish Aboriginal title. Why is it not so that the continued existence of a culture, societal
values and activities are not sufficient to establish Aboriginal rights? Why is it
that the judicial recognition of the evolving nature of territorial occupation
between the time of sovereignty and the present in the case of Aboriginal title is
not applied to the individual Aboriginal activities not directly associated with
the use and enjoyment of land title? 102 We note that in Van der Peet,
L’Heureux-Dubé J. adopted just such an approach for Aboriginal rights in her
dissenting reasons.103
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We propose a return to the first principles originally articulated by John
Marshall C.J. of the United States Supreme Court in the foundational trilogy of
Johnson, Cherokee Nation and Worcester,104 first principles also set out in
Calder by the Supreme Court of Canada and indeed invoked by Lamer C.J. as
well as the present Chief Justice and L’Heureux-Dubé J. in Van der Peet.105
These first principles include the existence of self-governing and independent
nations or peoples occupying or using determined geographical areas which
later became the subject of European sovereign assertions. These European
sovereign assertions should not become the lens through which to examine the
existence or continuation of the rights and titles of these pre-existing nations or
peoples106 rather the focus should turn to establishing accommodation and
reconciliation in the continuing existence and evolution of these societies. Here
the Sparrow analysis and its emphasis on the exercise rather than the existence
of rights would serve well.
We note that the justification analysis of the Sparrow test has been elaborated in theory in three Supreme Court judgments: in Sparrow107 the Court set
out the justification test in cases involving sustenance rights and other Aboriginal rights that are internally limited; in Gladstone108 the Court set out a separate

inal practices, traditions and customs also changed and evolved, including the utilisation of
the land, methods of hunting and fishing, trade of goods between tribes, and so on.
104
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having institutions of their own, and governing themselves by their own laws.
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justification test for trading rights and those that are not internally limited; and,
in Delgamuukw109 the Court set out a justification test for interference with
Aboriginal title.
Ironically, the justification test has received little more than theoretical
treatment by the Supreme Court as the Crown very rarely attempts to justify
interference with an Aboriginal right at trial, preferring to argue that the right
was not established, that it was extinguished and, as in Mitchell, that it is “inconsistent with Crown sovereignty.”110
As we have seen, the seeds of a solution lie buried in the jurisprudence of the
Supreme Court of Canada — in Calder, in Sparrow, in Van der Peet, in Delgamuukw.111
A distillation of the appropriate principles found in this jurisprudence,
whether in majority, minority or dissenting reasons, indicates a way forward.
No a priori assumptions about “Indianness” ought to apply to defeat an Aboriginal claim. Consistent with the recognition in Calder of the pre-existence of
Aboriginal societies as self-governing, self-sufficient entities, the evidentiary
burden relating to the historical existence of a right should be applied with
reference to the general characteristics of the relevant Aboriginal society, not
the specificity or particularity of discrete activities. Thus, a claim of an Aboriginal right to trade in salmon would be determined by whether, in pre-contact
times, the Aboriginal society in question engaged in trade in the products of
harvesting generally and whether this activity was meaningful to them. Or,
using Mitchell as an example, the evidentiary burden would be met by establishing that the Mohawks historically travelled in a determined geographical
area, engaged in diplomacy and trade with other First Nations and that these
activities constituted meaningful components of their society. 112
Aboriginal plaintiffs would still have to establish that a Canadian law or
regulation interfered with their Aboriginal right as prescribed by Sparrow. This
having been done, the burden of proof would then switch to the government to
establish extinguishment or, if that could not be shown, then to establish, on the
basis of evidence, justification for the limitation of the exercise of the right.
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Thus, if the Crown could show on the evidence that an Aboriginal right to trade
in salmon would result in unacceptable conservation risks to the species, then
the right would not be exercisable.
We propose that, consistent with the federal government’s stated policy of
preferring to focus on reaching practical and workable agreements on how
Aboriginal rights will be exercised, the Sparrow inquiry should refocus onto
questions regarding the exercise of the Aboriginal right in the context of contemporary Canadian society. This would result in a more equal evidentiary
burden for the parties when they enter into litigation, and, more importantly, it
would focus the inquiry before the courts on questions that are truly meaningful
and relevant to contemporary Canadian, and Aboriginal societies.
In this new universe, the Courts could cease patrolling cultural borders and
concentrate on applying the law towards reconciling and ensuring the coexistence and collaboration of proud, evolving and interdependent cultures and
societies across those borders.
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